NIOSH report released on LODD of CFD Captain Herbie Johnson

NIOSH Report on the LODD of Chicago FD Captain Herbie Johnson

Career Captain Sustains Injuries at a 2-1/2 Story Apartment Fire then Dies at Hospital – Illinois

Executive Summary

On November 2, 2012, a 54-year-old male career captain sustained fatal injuries during a fire at a 2-1/2 story apartment building in Chicago. The incident occurred just blocks from his own fire station. Battalion Chief 19 (BC19) was the first to arrive and reported heavy smoke coming from both the front and rear of the attic. While BC19 conducted an interior survey of the first and second floors, the victim and a firefighter from Engine 123 stretched a 2½-inch line with a gated wye to a 1¾-inch hoseline toward the second floor. BC19 radioed the victim from the rear of the first floor, indicating heavy fire in the covered porch and stairwell. The victim and the firefighter advanced the hoseline toward the rear of the second-floor apartment. Before water could be applied, the victim told the firefighter, “We need to get out.”

Engine 49, arriving as the second due engine, stretched a 2½-inch hoseline down the alley to the rear of the structure, aiming to attack the fire through the attic window. As the victim moved halfway back into the hallway toward the kitchen, he yelled for help. A firefighter dragged him toward the kitchen, but before they could escape, the two collapsed on the floor. A Mayday was called by the Squad 5 Lieutenant, and the victim was carried down to the front yard. He responded briefly to basic life support and was transferred to Ambulance 19 for advanced care. Upon arrival at the hospital, the victim experienced complications during airway management and later succumbed to his injuries.

Contributing Factors

• Modified building construction with multiple ceilings and a multi-story enclosed rear porch
• Horizontal ventilation contributed to rapid fire growth
• Inadequate fireground communications
• Lack of proper personal protective equipment
• No sprinkler system in the residential rental building

Key Recommendations

• Coordinate fireground operations with consideration for the effects of horizontal ventilation on ventilation-limited fires
• Ensure clear communication of strategy and action plan by the Incident Commander
• Establish a stationary command post early in the incident to manage information, communications, and accountability
• Apply risk management principles at all structure fires
• Ensure all personnel are properly equipped with personal protective gear
• Confirm that all communications are acknowledged and progress is reported
• Provide Incident Commanders with chief aides to assist in managing information and communication
• Maintain appropriate staffing levels throughout the incident

According to department procedures, the following units were dispatched to the initial report of the fire until the Mayday was called:

Still Alarm
Engine 123 (E123): Captain (victim), engineer, 3 firefighters
Tower Ladder 39 (TL39): Lieutenant, driver, 2 firefighters – Note: The company was one firefighter short, known as a variance.
Engine 49 (E49): Lieutenant, engineer, 2 firefighters – Note: Also on a variance.
Truck 33 (T33): Captain, driver, 3 firefighters
Battalion Chief 19 (BC19): Incident Commander (IC)
RIT Alarm
Truck 52 (T52): Lieutenant, driver, 3 firefighters
Squad 5 (SQ5): Lieutenant and five firefighters – Note: This unit includes a heavy rescue vehicle and a 55-foot Snorkel; staffing consists of an officer and three firefighters on the rescue vehicle and two on the Snorkel.
Battalion Chief 15 (BC15): RIT Chief
Ambulance 19 (A19): Two paramedics
Unit 455: EMS Field Officer
Unit 273: Command Van

Timeline

The following timeline outlines key events during the incident. Times are approximate and based on dispatch records, witness statements, and department logs. It is not intended as an official record of events.

• 1716 Hours
  Dispatch for a Still Alarm for “Smoke in the area”: E123, TL39, E49, T33, BC19. BC19 assumed command en route, confirmed a working fire, and initiated a RIT response with T52, SQ5, BC15, A19, 455, and 273.
• 1717 Hours
  E123, E49, TL39, and T33 en route; BC19 arrived on scene in under a minute and entered the structure to assess the situation.
• 1719 Hours
  E123 on scene.
• 1720 Hours
  E49, T33, and TL39 on scene; reported black smoke from the front attic window and heavy smoke and flames in the rear.
• 1721 Hours (approximate)
  E123 crew entered with a 1¾-inch hoseline to the second floor; E49 pulled a 2½-inch hoseline down the alley to Sector 3; T33 set up a ground ladder on Sector 2; TL39 positioned an aerial on the roof. A firefighter from SQ5 and T33 assisted TL39. Shortly after, a TL39 firefighter entered the first floor exterior porch door, noticed fire in the stairwell, and backed out.
• 1723 Hours
  IC radioed the victim about heavy fire in the rear stairway and covered porch, and informed E49 to apply water from Sector 3. No reply was heard.
• 1724 Hours
  E49 applied water to the attic window in Sector 3 with a 2½-inch hoseline.
• 1725 Hours
  SQ5 made entry on Sector 1.
• 1727 Hours
  TL39 completed the first hole in the roof on Sector 4. After hearing the Mayday over the radio from the SQ5 Lieutenant, the IC called “Mayday” and requested a 2-11 Assignment. Dispatch initiated a 2-11 alarm.
• 1728 Hours (approximate)
  IC ran to meet A19’s crew.
• 1729 Hours
  Firefighters carried the victim outside to Sector 1 and performed CPR.
• 1738 Hours
  A19 en route to the hospital with the victim.

Investigation

The investigation revealed that the fire originated in the attic and was accidental. The fire had been burning for some time before it was noticed by residents on the second floor. Smoke was visible from blocks away, and the fire spread quickly due to horizontal ventilation. The victim and a firefighter advanced the hoseline toward the rear of the second floor, but before water could be applied, the victim ordered them to evacuate. Despite efforts to rescue him, the victim suffered severe inhalation injuries and died at the hospital.

Fire Behavior

Fire behavior was influenced by the building’s unique construction, including multiple ceilings and an enclosed rear porch. Horizontal ventilation exacerbated the fire’s growth, causing rapid fire spread. Indicators included heavy smoke from the attic, fire intensifying in the stairwell, and the failure of the second-floor rear porch door. The fire eventually became too intense, forcing a defensive operation.

Contributing Factors

Several factors contributed to the fatality, including modified building design, improper ventilation, communication issues, lack of PPE, and absence of a sprinkler system.

Cause of Death

The medical examiner determined that the victim died from inhalation injuries sustained during the fire.

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